Human vaccines against several common foodborne pathogens are being developed and could substantially alter consumer and producer behaviour in the markets for foods commonly afflicted by these pathogens. To understand the possible impacts of such an innovation, we derive and calibrate a partial-equilibrium model using parameters for consumer vaccine uptake from stated-preference work under an array of assumptions concerning industry moral hazard, consumer awareness and alternative preventive effort exercised by consumers. We simulate three scenarios in the U.S. beef sector: the introduction of a vaccine, the tightening of pathogen standards for beef production and the simultaneous introduction of both vaccinations and tighter standards. Our simulation shows that all policies can increase aggregate surplus given most calibrations; though, the largest effects are attributed to vaccine introductions, which reduce expected damages from foodborne illness among vaccinated consumers without shifting firm costs. However, unaware consumers and aware consumers who choose not to vaccinate experience no change in expected damages when a vaccine is introduced but face a higher price of food because of the stronger demand of food from vaccinated consumers.
Introduction
The development of human vaccines to protect against food pathogens is progressing rapidly (e.g see Flynn 2009 [Escherichia coli vaccine] and Stevens 2009 [Salmonella and Campylobacter vaccines] ). Each vaccine is at a different stage of development. The inventor of the E. coli vaccination reports that discussions are underway with pharmaceutical companies to approve the vaccine through clinical trials (Fosmire 2011; MSU 2011) . The research team investigating Campylobacter vaccines has demonstrated efficacy across several animal species (Monteriro et al. 2009) , while advances concerning the study of Salmonella activation (Crabbe et al. 2011) suggest promising pathways to vaccine development.
This research may produce applications that have important impacts on food markets. Such vaccines would represent a discrete improvement in the technology available to combat foodborne illness. The widespread availability of such vaccines may trigger a cascade of possible actions by consumers and industry that could impact substantially the markets for foods historically affected by foodborne pathogens. However, to our knowledge, there exists no previous work that models how the introduction of such a vaccine might impact the functioning of food markets, and furthermore, there exists little investigation into the role of consumer self-protection on aggregate food demand. 1 In this study, we develop a partial-equilibrium model that specifically accounts for the introduction of such a consumer vaccine and traces out changes to consumer and producer surplus in the affected food market under a variety of possible consumer and industry responses. Our analysis accounts for several key nuances that would impact aggregate market outcomes, including the possibility that some consumers are unaware of foodborne threats, that aware consumers may alter other self-protection activities, that firms may decrease pathogen-reduction vigilance in response to consumer vaccination and that vaccinations are imperfect in stopping all sources of foodborne illness. We then calibrate the model using parameters from the previous econometric studies of the U.S. beef sector and from the previous stated-preference studies of uptake for such vaccines.
From this calibrated model, we simulate three scenarios. The first is the sale of a vaccine. This intervention leaves firms' marginal beef production costs unchanged (or lower under moral hazard assumptions) and can stimulate beef demand among the vaccinated. However, unaware consumers and aware consumers who choose not to vaccinate experience no change in expected damages (or higher expected damages under moral hazard) but face a higher price of food because of stronger beef demand from vaccinated consumers.
The second policy simulated is the introduction of tighter standards that lower the ambient pathogen level and expected consumer damages (see Unnevehr 2000) . This shifts the marginal cost curve upward, while shifting beef demand upward via a reduction in expected damages among aware consumers. Unaware consumers suffer from higher beef prices but suffer a lower cost of ignorance as expected damages diminish with tighter standards. The third policy simulated is the simultaneous introduction of the first two policies.
We find that, under many parameter assumptions concerning vaccine effectiveness, industry moral hazard and consumer response via alternative selfprotection activities, vaccinated consumers prefer the vaccine policy to be implemented independently. However, the introduction of a vaccine can have disparate effects across consumers as those who fail to adopt the vaccine may be exposed to higher pathogen loads if industry exhibits moral hazard and higher beef prices if industry maintains previous food safety practices. Firms may prefer the joint policy, but the result depends upon the exact magnitudes of vaccine uptake, marginal cost shifts and assumptions concerning consumer beef demand.
Our work differs from the previous food safety work in that it is the first to focus on the market-level effects of a new self-protection technology. The bulk of extant literature in food safety economics focusses on understanding the conceptual and methodological challenges faced in understanding consumer willingness to pay for food safety interventions (Teisl and Roe 2010) or on the costs or market impacts of firm-level food safety regulations (Antle 2000) . Our work also differs from the general literature on the economics of vaccines, which largely focus on establishing vaccine demand for communicable diseases (Cropper et al. 2004) or the role of public versus private vaccination efforts in disease eradication (Geoffard and Philipson 1997) . On the basis of the estimates of consumer willingness to pay for new foodborne pathogen vaccines, the calibration exercise illustrates our contribution with a simple example for showing that the methodology can be used and refined by public authorities for estimating welfare measures of policies. We contribute to the literature by going beyond estimations of willingness to pay for a product, and by generating welfare estimates for different policy scenarios on the beef market indirectly impacted by human vaccines against foodborne pathogens.
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From a policy point of view, our work may reignite discussions about the relative roles of consumers and industry in ensuring the safety of a nation's food supply and the distributional consequences of different policies. The literature contains little discussion about the optimal balance of consumer versus industry effort for improving food safety, and the work that exists is either highly theoretical in nature (Roe 2004) or focussed on how the costs of food safety certification should be shared (Crespi and Marette 2001) .
In the next section, we develop the partial-equilibrium model. In the following sections, we calibrate a model of the U.S. beef sector using parameters from the literature and then derive market results for the scenarios outlined above. We end with discussion and concluding remarks.
The partial-equilibrium model
We begin by specifying consumer preferences in the spirit of Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) but with some differences. The demand of consumer i is derived from the following expected utility expression:
where a and b are the linear and quadratic preference parameters for beef, q i is the quantity of beef consumed, p i is the consumer's subjective probability of acquiring foodborne illness, I i is an indicator variable that equals one if the consumer is aware that beef may contain the pathogens targeted by the vaccine, r i is the per-unit damage consumer i expects to suffer in the event of foodborne illness, w i is the amount spent on a numeraire good, l is the per-unit cost of preventive effort and e i is the quantity of preventive effort expended by consumer i to avoid the foodborne illness. The subjective probability of becoming ill p i 2 [0, 1) is:
where S is the ambient safety of the food provided by firms, V i (q, S, e i ) is an indicator variable that equals one if the consumer chooses vaccination and q is the price of the vaccination. Without vaccination, V i (q, S, e i ) = 0, which means the consumer faces a strictly positive probability of illness equal to p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp > 0. Vaccination implies V i (q, S, e i ) = 1, which provides a reduction Dp in the probability of becoming ill. However, even with vaccination, the consumer may still face a positive probability of becoming ill (p 0 (S, e i ) ‡ 0) because of either imperfections in the vaccine or threats from other foods and contaminants that are not eliminated by industry (S) or personal effort (e i ). For instance, someone could take a vaccine against E. coli O157:H7 because they like undercooked meat and poultry. This undercooked meat or poultry could easily harbour Salmonella or some other harmful pathogen, making the person sick.
Furthermore, for simplicity, we view beef as an undifferentiated good and assume that all consumers face identical prices (beef, vaccine and preventive effort) and identical expected damages (r i = r). Ambient (average) food safety is public knowledge across all consumers. We also assume that vaccine supply is perfectly elastic and priced at marginal cost. We also assume that preventive efforts other than the vaccination are fixed in the short run and that these costs are rolled into the numeraire expenditure w i ; though, this assumption can be relaxed.
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With previous assumptions and Equation (2), we can rewrite (1) as follows:
The utility function (3) is maximised via the choice of q i and subject to the budget constraint of pq i + qV i + w i = y i , where p is the price of beef and y i denotes the income of consumer i. This leads to the following inverse demand function:
S, e i ÞDpgr= b. For consumer i, the discrete decision (0 or 1) to become vaccinated depends upon a simple comparison of the price of the vaccine to the expected damages, including all the sources of contamination and their impacts on different products (recall there may be other sources of contamination in addition to the goods studied in this partial-equilibrium setting). The effort e i is also fixed for the time being.
Hence, the likelihood of vaccination by consumer i is decreasing in the price of vaccination (q), the effort (e i ) and increasing in the per-unit damage (r). Note that, for simplicity, we assume no income effects, for example, you never buy less meat because you have to pay for the vaccine. We assume that the probability of purchasing the vaccine V i (q, S, e i ) is the same for all consumers and, after aggregation, can be shifted in a proportion estimated via the econometric estimation and defined byVðq, S, e i Þ as described in the next section. The function defined by (3) is used to calculate Marshallian welfare linked to the beef market only.
Aggregate demand for the good is obtained by summing individual demand functions over all N consumers. For the vaccinated consumers, we assume I i = 1, which means that consumers are aware that the food may imply a damage r and may contain the pathogens targeted by the vaccine. This assumption means that the ones choosing the vaccine are highly concerned and aware of damages.
Conceptually, total demand can be partitioned into three groups: (i) those who are vaccinated, (ii) those who are not vaccinated and aware of the damage and (iii) those who are not vaccinated and unaware of the damage.
The proportionVðq, S, e i Þ of consumers is vaccinated and has an individual demand denoted as q i ðp,1; 1Þ. However, even with vaccination, the consumer may still face a positive probability of becoming ill (p 0 (S, e i ) ‡ 0) because of either imperfections in the vaccine or threats from other foods and contaminants. With b ¼ b=N, the demand over theVðq, S, e i ÞN consumers is defined by 
The proportion 1 ÀVðq, S, e i Þ of consumers is not vaccinated and may suffer damage equal to r. Among them, a proportion b of consumers are not aware of the damage (I i = 0). This group generates a cost of ignorance in the welfare analysis. A proportion ð1 ÀVðq, S, e i ÞÞb of consumers who are not vaccinated and are not aware of the damage have an individual demand denoted as q i ðp, 0, 0Þ. The demand over the ð1 ÀVðq, S, e i ÞÞbN consumers is defined by
The damage does not impact the demand because of this segment's lack of awareness. The cost of ignorance (or non-internalised damage)
ðpÞ is taken into account in the welfare calculation. It means that the regulator takes into account the subjective probability and damage estimated by consumers in the cost of ignorance and not the one expressed by experts.
Eventually, a proportion ð1 ÀVðq, S, e i ÞÞð1 À bÞ of consumers who are not vaccinated and are aware of the per-unit damage r will have an individual demand denoted as q i ðp; 1; 0Þ. The demand over the ð1 ÀVðq, S, e i ÞÞð1 À bÞN consumers is:
The damage is internalised and there is no cost of ignorance. The overall demand is:
which is a relatively simple expression that can be calibrated for given values of b andVðqÞ. The respective inverse demands are: 
The proportionVðq,S,e i Þ influences the balance between demands. Note that a value ofVðq,S,e i Þ tending towards 0 leads to p D 1 ðQÞ¼0 (the same effect is valid for other inverse demands).
On the supply side, a perfectly competitive industry with price-taking firms is assumed regardless of any policy intervention. There are M firms. Firms' cost functions are quadratic in output, and they choose output to maximise profits:
where f and c are parameters defining the variable cost. 4 The profit maximisation yields individual firm supply functions that can be added up to yield overall industry supply:
The parameters c and f will vary with the food safety policies chosen. In particular, c H > c means that firms confronted with tighter food pathogen regulations incur higher marginal cost than firms with looser standards.
For both simplicity and ease of exposition, the profits and surpluses are described graphically. Figure 1 represents the baseline scenario with the quantity on the horizontal axis and the prices on the vertical axis.
With the baseline scenario, there is no vaccine (equivalent to q fi ¥ leading toVðqÞ ! 0) and standards are at a baseline level. As a result,Vðq, S, e i Þ is 0 and p Figure 1 , the baseline scenario is represented by the equilibrium price p E that equalises the overall demand D 2 + D 3 and the overall supply S based on Figure 1 Baseline and tighter standards scenarios. 4 A complete analysis should consider the impact that sunk costs have on the entry and exit of producers.
5 Individual supply functions are only defined for prices exceeding average costs, because otherwise firms would obviously cease production. Figure 1 . The producer profit is defined by the area OkEp E . Tightening pathogen standards for all firms leads to an upward supply (S) shift linked to the cost increase, with the new supply curve represented by the bold line S' in Figure 1 . Implementing tighter standards decreases the subjective probability to Dp with Dp<Dp. The cost of ignorance decreases for the unaware consumers because the expected per-unit damage Dpr is lower because of the standard with Dpr<Dpr. The aware consumers increase their demand to D . The welfare effect of tighter standards implementation characterised by the comparison of welfare in E and H depends on the relative change of the supply curve and the probability of contamination. If the proportion of unaware consumers b is large relative to other parameters, the equilibrium quantity Q H in H is lower than the equilibrium quantity Q E in E because of the supply shift. We now turn to the case where the vaccine is introduced. Figure 2 represents the impact of the vaccine (withVðq, S, e i Þ>0) on the market allocation compared with the baseline scenario in point E (with the demand represented by the dashed curves). For the vaccinated consumers, the demand defined by Equation (6) is p 1 (Q) and represented by D 1v in Figure 2 . Compared with the baseline scenario E, the curves of unvaccinated consumers decrease with D 2v < D 2 and D 3v < D 3 becauseVðq, S, e i Þ>0. The number of aware consumers with a demand depending on the damage decreases when the number of vaccinated consumers increases.
With the vaccine, the new equilibrium V leads to a price p V and a quantity Q V . The proportion ½1 ÀVðq, S, e i Þ of unvaccinated consumers influences the cost of ignorance of the unaware consumers defined by the area 0DprnQ As the vaccine purchase and its demand are not detailed in our framework, we do not integrate the vaccine cost in our analysis of the welfare variation. Clearly, the effects on firms or consumers are different under tighter pathogen standards and vaccine policies. To explore these differences, we parameterise the model in an attempt to calibrate the U.S. beef market.
Model parameterisation
Calibration of the model requires fundamental supply and demand parameters for the U.S. beef market as well as information concerning vaccine uptake, consumer expected damages, consumer awareness and marginal cost shifts owing to tighter pathogen standards. We consider the beef market for the year 2006. The consumer demand parameters a and b as defined in the baseline scenario can be determined by standard calibration methods using existing data on price elasticity of beef demand and equilibrium prices and quantities of beef (see Table 1 ).
Using existing data on the quantityQ E of beef during 2006, the average pricep E observed during 2006, and the direct price elasticityê ¼ ðdQ E = dP E ÞðP E =Q E Þ obtained from time-series econometric estimates, the calibration of Q D ðpÞ given by (5) leads to estimated values for the demand equal to 1=b
The value {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp}r is determined by experimental results as explained in the following paragraph. The calibration of the demand is made for initial situations where the vaccine does not exist, soVðq, S, e i Þ ¼ 0. Figure 2 Baseline and vaccination scenarios. Source: * Lusk and Marette (2010) . † Bryant and Davis (2008) . ‡ Authors' assumptions. Notes: We abstract away from quality differences linked to the leanness because, to the best of our knowledge, there are no data on quantities differing by fat content at the retail level -only prices varying by fat content. As a percentage of beef purchases, 43% are of lower fat and remaining 57% is of higher fat products. Thus, the weighted average price would be 0.43 · 3.26 + 0.57 · 2.34 = 2.73.
For estimating the per-unit damage r, we take results given by experimental economics. Hayes et al. (1995) found respondents willing to pay 15-30 per cent more for food that is essentially completely safe from five pathogens found in ground beef (with realistic probabilities linked to these risks revealed to consumers). This experiment measured the participants' bids to exchange a real (and relatively risky) hamburger similar to those participants could buy in fast food stores for a riskless hamburger. This willingness to pay is often used as the social value of non-contamination and is widely cited.
6 This experiment did not include Listeria and participants were students. We take into account the relative change in the willingness to pay equal of 30 per cent given by Hayes et al. (1995) . The 30 per cent represents in relative terms what they are willing to pay to go from a subjective probability {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp} to 0 risk (recall that there is no vaccine with V i (q, S, e i ) = 0). Despite flaws, we use this relative change in the willingness to pay to calibrate {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp}r. Regarding the calibration, the expected per-unit damage is defined ex ante, including this perceived probability. The relative change in the willingness to pay given by the experiment is equal to the expected damage {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp}r relative to the equilibrium pricep E , namely fp 0 ðS, e i Þþ Dpgr=p E ¼ 0:3. From the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network survey used for the stated-preference data (see the next paragraph and Table 2 for details), the median respondent had a subjective probability that 10 per cent of hamburger found in stores would cause sickness (before any vaccine decision), so we say that the subjective probability {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp} = 0.1. The per-unit damage r is defined by the following equality: r ¼ 0:3 Âp E =ð0:1Þ. This value is used in the baseline scenario. Note that, in the baseline scenario, there is only the subjective probability {p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp} = 0.1, which does not imply any assumption regarding the vaccine efficiency and the related share between p 0 (S, e i ) and Dp. To measure the impact of the tighter pathogen standards, we assume that the probability is divided by two with p 0 ðS, e i Þ þ Dp ¼ ðp 0 ðS, e i Þ þ DpÞ=2 ¼ 0:05. It is also assumed a cost c H = 1.1 · c with c defined in Equation (9) when tighter standards are introduced. The initial proportion of unaware consumers is b = 0.2, which is consistent with results of the 2001 Food Safety Survey where between 10 and 20 per cent of respondents had reported being unaware of pathogens like Salmonella or E. coli.
Vaccine uptake is calibrated using stated-preference results (details about the method and data are provided in Marette et al. 2012) . In it, we use data obtained from the Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network survey to estimate U.S. consumer acceptance of food safety vaccines that would protect the individual from Salmonella, E. coli or Listeria across various time periods. We assume an individual's probability of purchasing the vaccine is a linear function of the respondent's subjective assessment of their risk of getting sick, the respondent's subjective assessment of the severity of potential illness without the vaccine, the vaccine's attributes (price, duration of protection) and other respondent characteristics. In Table 2 , we reproduce the results of the vaccine uptake model, which details the probability of purchasing the vaccine used in the calibrated partial-equilibrium model, with a description of the variable used. Note that the vaccination choice is already driven by consumers' risk aversion via the Severity of Illness variable (in Table 2 ), so it is already part of our model. The average vaccine uptake used in Equations (2)- (6) is given by:
where F(.) is the standard normal cumulative density function. From the last column of Table 2 ,ĥ 1 ¼ À0:0088 is the estimated coefficient linked to the vaccine price q, andĥ 2 ¼ 0:026;ĥ 3 ¼ À0:0002 are the estimated coefficients linked to the duration, which is assumed to be a single year. The transposed vectorĤ T Dummies takes into account the estimated coefficients linked to the vector of dummy variables I, which correspond to the type of disease (E. coli in our case) and to the type of products (hamburger in our case). The transposed vectorĤ T other integrates all the other estimated coefficients of Table 2 , and X is the vector of the average values of the other independent variables used in the estimation. The vaccine price q is varied as part of the simulations and different possibilities are considered regarding p 0 (S, e i ).
Results
We simulate three cases. Under case 1, the vaccine price is q = 50 and the initial proportion of unaware consumers is b = 0.2. Under case 2, the vaccine price is q = 20 and the initial proportion of unaware consumers is b = 0.2. For cases 1 and 2, we assume that the vaccine is completely efficient and perfectly eliminates all risks with Dp = 0.1 and p 0 (S, e i ) = 0. For case 3 (with q = 50 and b = 0.2 as with case 1), we consider an imperfect vaccine reducing two-thirds of the risk with p 0 (S, e i ) = (1/3) * 0.1 and Dp = (2/3) * 0.1, which leaves subjective post-vaccination risk of 0.033. In this case 3, the combination of the vaccine and tighter pathogen standards leads to the subjective probability divided by 2 with p 0 ðS, e i Þ ¼ ð1=6Þ Ã 0:1 and Dp ¼ ð2=6Þ Ã 0:1. Table 3 presents results for the year 2006 in the United States given these parameter values. Separate welfare calculations are reported for firms and for the three groups of consumers (vaccinated, unaware unvaccinated and aware unvaccinated). Three policies are considered: vaccination, tighter standards and a combination of vaccination and tighter standards. Table 3 shows that, for the three cases, the total welfare variation is positive under all three policies. However, not all parties gain under all scenarios and different parties would likely prefer different policy options. Within a given row, the vaccine uptake differs between columns 2 and 3, because the improved standards alter vaccine uptake (defined by (11)). The standard increases the 'No Illness' variable defined in Table 2 . We assume that the 'No Illness' variable increases from 0.121 to 2 * 0.121, which decreases the vaccine uptake. Note that a standard also impedes firms from slackening their safety effort when consumers are vaccinated.
Let us first consider the consumer point of view. In all three cases, for consumers in aggregate, the vaccine policy (second column) generates greater benefits than tighter standards (first column) because the price increase is much smaller with vaccination than with tighter standards (see )347.2 ()1.6%) 1968.6 (9.1%) 485.8 (2.3%) Vaccinated -2169.7 (19.3%) 801.8 (7.6%) Non-vaccinated, unaware )8.1 ()0.1%) )54.2 ()2.8%) )32.7 ()1.6%) Non-vaccinated, aware )339.0 ()2.0%) )216.9 ()2.7%) )283.2 ()3.3%) Welfare variation 346.3 (1.0%) 2511.9 (7.0%) 1476.0 (4.4%)
Note: Relative variation (%) compared with the baseline scenario in parentheses.
the difference between Figures 1 and 2 ). This is driven by the fact that, under tighter standards, firm costs rise and drive up equilibrium price. That is, the disutility caused by increased prices outweighs the improved utility from diminished expected damages for the set of parameters chosen in this simulation. While consumer benefits from vaccination are positive in aggregate, not all consumers benefit. In fact, vaccinated consumers are the only group of consumers to benefit under this policy. Non-vaccinated consumers suffer from the price increase linked to the demand shift caused by vaccinated consumers but find no relief from damages as beef continues to contain the same pathogen loads. However, the gains to vaccinated consumers are larger than the losses to non-vaccinated consumers, which leads to large aggregate gains for consumers.
Consumers who would not choose to vaccinate under a vaccination policy prefer tighter standards to a vaccination policy. While tighter standards drive up equilibrium price via an increase in firm costs, these consumers benefit through a reduction in damage provided by the tighter standards.
When considering the consumer point of view regarding the combined policy of both vaccination and tighter standards, we find that it is always the middle option for consumers. Vaccinated consumers prefer a policy of vaccination only because under the combined policy of vaccination and standards they face higher prices owing to increased firm costs; furthermore, those increased firms costs linked to the standard do nothing more for reducing damages as they are already fully protected from all damages.
From the firms' point of view, they prefer vaccinations in combination with tighter standards for the three scenarios explored in Table 3 . The policy of vaccination alone yields the second largest improvement in firm profits, while increased standards alone generate the smallest increase in profits.
7 A combination of vaccination and tighter standards strengthens demand even more; though, it also entails an increase in firm costs. Firm's exact preference between vaccination alone and vaccination in tandem with tighter standards will depend upon the size of the increase in costs and the per cent of aware consumers who will increase demand in the face of tighter standards.
Case 2 shows the positive impact of a decline in the vaccine price on both vaccine uptake and welfare. For case 3, the vaccinated consumer may still face a positive probability of becoming ill with p 0 (S, e i ) > 0, which reduces the private and social benefits of vaccination. The impact of the vaccine's imperfection is illustrated by comparing case 3 with case 1 in Table 3 . Welfare variation is higher under case 1 with a perfect vaccine (p 0 (S, e i ) = 0) than under case 3 because of the residual risk. Recall that this probability p 0 (S, e i ) is difficult to calibrate as it depends on medical characteristics. 7 Note that a tighter standard alone leads to increased profits owing to the relatively low own-price demand elasticity.
Other preventive efforts by consumers
We now turn to the precise study of the consumers' preventive effort and the impact of the vaccine on this effort made before consuming. This takes into account other preventive efforts such as preparation practices and careful refrigeration, as an endogenous variable. That is, we now allow the variable e i in (1) to be endogenous. Some simplifying assumptions are necessary.
First, for simplicity, we detail the choice of effort when the vaccine choice is already decided. It is also assumed that the effort decision is decided before the purchasing decision. In a previous stage, the preventive effort is determined by taking into account the purchase decision of beef and the estimated surplus determined as in Figures 1 and 2 (the 'game' is solved by backward induction). The estimated surplus coming from the beef purchased now integrates the cost of effort, le i .
Second, the choice of effort is discrete (e i equals 0 or 1), which simplifies the calculation regarding the surplus maximisation. Third, the impact of preventive effort on the probability is linear and given by (1 ) de i ){p 0 (S, e i ) + Dp}. An effort e i = 1 reduces the probability of being sick without vaccination
(S, e i )} > 0). Fourth, it is assumed that inside each subgroup defined in Equation (8), all consumers take the same decision regarding the preventive effort based on the comparison between the surplus with the effort and the surplus without the effort. It means that all the vaccinated and aware consumers make the same decision regarding preventive effort. Similarly, all the non-vaccinated and aware consumers make the same decision, while unaware consumers make no effort (e i = 0). The incentive constraints for making preventive effort are considered for vaccinated and aware consumers and for non-vaccinated and aware consumers.
Fifth, we used the parameters of case 3 (in Table 3 ) with p 0 (S, e i ) > 0. As the demand Q D 3 ðpÞ for aware consumers given by (6) is positive under the absence of vaccine (namely for V(q, S, e i ) = 0), the calibration of the baseline scenario without vaccination depends on the effort made by these consumers. The demand can be rewritten as
The calibration without vaccination is made for the case where the effort is made (e equal to 1) and for the case where the effort is not made (e equal to 0). For each case, we check that no deviation brings a better surplus and consider cases consistent with this absence of deviation. With a proportion of Vðq, S, e i Þ>0 consumers choosing the vaccination, results are presented in Figure 3 with the impact of the effort on the probability d on the horizontal axis and the overall cost of the effort P l over all consumers choosing the effort. For the chart at the top of Figure 3 , all aware consumers select effort in the absence of vaccine (which is valid for areas A and B where no deviation is profitable for consumers). The vaccine introduction leads to the following choices in areas A and B. For a relatively low cost of effort compared with the effort efficiency d (in area A), all consumers continue making the effort.
For a medium cost of effort compared with the effort efficiency d (in area B), consumers choosing the vaccine do not take preventive effort. In this case, vaccinated consumers slacken their effort compared with the initial situation without vaccine. The shaded area above area B indicates that consumers without any vaccination would have an incentive to avoid preventive efforts, which would contradict the assumption of positive effort made for calibrating the baseline scenario.
For the chart at the bottom of Figure 3 , all aware consumers were making no effort under the absence of vaccine (which is valid for areas C and D where no deviation is profitable for consumers and not valid for the shaded area). For a medium cost of effort compared with the effort efficiency d (in area C), non-vaccinated and aware consumers choose preventive effort, while they did not choose effort in the absence of vaccination. In this case, the vaccination influencing the beef price changed the incentive to make the effort for the non-vaccinated consumers. In area D, the vaccine does not change consumer behaviour because the effort is costly.
Extensions and robustness checks
To focus on the main economic mechanisms and to keep the mathematical aspects as simple as possible, the analytical framework was admittedly simple. Our aim was mainly to show that we can go beyond the simple WTP estimations by calibrating a model and studying regulatory choices. To fit different problems coming from various contexts, some extensions should be integrated into the model presented here. Additional data could be collected for refining the model. In particular, additional data about the time spent by households to prevent foodborne illnesses are necessary for calibrating the parameter l in (1). Part of these data could be collected by a public authority undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. In several extensions, we also considered a nonlinear demand and the related utility function, which leads to close results compared with the results presented in Table 3 (details can be provided upon request).
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In particular, a large proportion of vaccinated consumers may induce moral hazard by firms within the food supply chain, where firms could slacken their prevention efforts. In Table 4 , we consider a case where the use of the vaccine by many consumers leads to industry moral hazard with a 10 per cent cost decline and to an increase in the subjective probability Dp from 0.1 to 0.2 (second column, Table 4) or to 0.15 (third column, Table 4 ). Within a row, the vaccine uptake differs between columns 1 and 2 (or 3), because the moral hazard decreases the 'No Illness' variable defined in Table 2 and influencing Equation (11). It is assumed that the 'No Illness' variable decreases from 0.121 to 0, which increases the vaccine uptake.
For this example, the large increase (2nd column) in the subjective probability leads to a large decline in the demand by the aware and non-vaccinated consumers, which leads to a large decline in the beef price. In this case, firms lose from slackening their safety effort and the resulting moral hazard is not profitable for the industry; though, because of an inability to coordinate privately, no firm would deviate and refrain from slackening standards. In the third column with Dp = 0.15, the moral hazard response does improve industry profits.
Conclusion
In this study, we take the first steps towards evaluating the possible indirect welfare impacts of introducing vaccines that can prevent illness caused by foodborne pathogens. Such an analysis requires an understanding of the potential demand both for such vaccines and for the complementary impact of vaccines on the demand for foods afflicted by the foodborne pathogens 8 The quasi-linear utility function given by (1) can be replaced by the following function: ½ðq i = AÞ 1þ1=e À ðr= AÞ 1þ1=e =ð1 þ 1=eÞ À I i fp 0 ðS, e i Þ þ Dp Ã ð1 À V i ðq,S,e i ÞÞgr i q i þ w i with a parameter r close to 0 but >0 since the direct price elasticity e such that )1 < e < 0 implies (1 + 1/e) < 0. The parameter A is positive and calibrated for representing the demand over a year. The maximization of this new utility function with respect to quantity and subject to the budget constraint detailed above leads to the following nonlinear demand: q d i ¼ Aðp þ I i fp 0 ðS, e i Þ þ Dp Ã ð1 À V i ðq, S, e i ÞÞgr i Þ e . These demands are aggregated in a similar way to the system (8) and lead to similar results. addressed by vaccination. We build a partial-equilibrium model of the U.S. beef sector that addresses this issue in the context of foodborne illness damages created by E. coli contamination.
Our calibrated model suggests that introducing a vaccine against foodborne pathogens may improve both consumer and firm welfare in markets for products that can carry these pathogens. For example, we found the vaccine stimulated demand for beef without imposing additional costs on firms. However, the robustness and magnitude of these market-specific impacts must be further explored in the light of the exploratory nature of our model and the difficulty in calibrating key parameters.
In some ways, the introduction of foodborne pathogen vaccines is not that different from other self-protection efforts by consumers, which include thorough cooking of food, attention to food preparation instructions and other forms of care in the handling, storing and preparing of food. However, if vaccines are popular, it may have large impacts on food markets (as shown in Table 3 for the beef market). These impacts should be taken into account by decision-makers.
Nonetheless, these results can instruct qualitative discussions of the impacts of ex ante regulatory measures which could streamline debate. This methodology of combining stated-preference calibration of novel demand elements with the pre-existing estimates of supply and demand parameters derived from market data may be systematically mobilised for cost-benefit analyses that can enlighten decision-makers on the best way to improve food safety. 
